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Sneak peek at Brexit book ‘The Case 
for Brexit’ 
The second book in our Bite-Size book series ‘The Case for Brexit’ 
has now been published and is available for you to enjoy! We’re 
celebrating the book’s release by giving you a sneak peek at a 
selection of writing from many of the book’s contributors. 
‘The Case for Brexit‘ gives a platform to the academic Brexiteers – 
those behind the likes of Boris Johnson and David Davis. The book is 
packed full of chapters from economists, historians and those who 
‘jumped ship’. The book has been edited by John Mair, Neil Fowler 
and Professor Alex de Ruyter, with a foreword by Sir John Redwood 
MP. 
Your sneak peek… 
 
Sir Andrew Wood, former UK Ambassador to Russia 
IS THE UK STUCK TO THE EU TAR BABY? 
THREE EU WEAKNESSES 
First, the Euro has not been the success it was imagined that it would 
be on its creation in stimulating growth and spreading prosperity 
among its members. It has, on the contrary, harmed some member 
states while benefitting others. It is not clear that those states under 
the obligation to adopt the Euro in due course will in practice do so. 
The measures forced upon Eurozone states in difficulty following the 
global economic crisis that began in 2008 were questionable in their 
wisdom. The Eurozone has yet to establish effective central 
supranational mechanisms that would enable it to deal with a future 
global crisis, despite fears that one may be in prospect. But the Euro 
is an essential tool for the pursuit of ever closer unity and dismantling 
it would be difficult. 
Second, migration. There are ironies in the UK being accused of 
prejudice against free movement of labour despite the fact that it 
opened its doors before nearly all its partners to people from those 
countries that had just joined the EU, but the ideological case for free 
movement in the EU is nonetheless a strong one. The practical 
difficulties in dealing with immigration into the Union and their 
consequences for free movement within the EU are nonetheless both 
difficult and contentious – as well as unsolved so far. 
Third, the relationship between the member states of the EU and its 
directing organs is unbalanced, and disputed. The question of where 
sovereignty lies was crucial to the British vote in 2016. Other member 
states, the latest being Italy, contest the right of Brussels based 
organs to issue directives overriding the decisions of democratically 
ruled EU states. Those organs encompass a set of ideas that carry 
force, along with its logic of promoting unified action across a wide 
range of fields. But they lack the legitimacy needed to secure their 
execution. Despite some of the aspirational rhetoric, there is no 
appetite within the EU to address this fundamental problem. 
 
John Mills, Chair, Labour Leave 
A SECOND REFERENDUM? 
RE-RUN – THE PRACTICAL ARGUMENTS 
Then there are all the practical arguments and factors which 
persuaded many Leave people to vote the way they did in June 2016. 
These include the size of our net annual payment to the EU, which 
has regularly been in excess of £10bn a year; the widespread desire 
for the UK to have control of our borders and who is allowed to live 
and work here; and a determination to have the laws by which we live 
in the hands of our own parliament rather than by unaccountable 
people abroad. 
We wanted then – and want now – to see the UK out of both the 
Common Agricultural and the Common Fisheries Policies, neither of 
which have been remotely in the interest of the British people. We 
also wish to be able to enter into free trade deals with the parts of the 
world which are growing much more rapidly than the EU, instead of 
being blocked from doing so by our membership of the EU Customs 
Union. 
To achieve these objectives, we would have to leave both the Single 
Market and the EU Customs Union as well as the EU itself. This would 
steer the UK clear of the integrationist proposals widely shared among 
the EU elite but never supported by all but a very small minority in the 
UK. 
If the Eurozone is to survive, it is clear that it can only do so by 
establishing a banking and then a political union on a scale which 
polls show that the vast majority of the people in the UK have never 
supported. With the example of Greece in mind, in particular, there 
would be substantial advantages to the UK of being outside the EU if 
the Eurozone fractures and fragments, as may well happen. 
Robert Tombs, Emeritus Professor, French History,  Cambridge 
University 
BREXIT: ONCE DESIRABLE, NOW INDISPENSABLE 
MY ‘JOURNEY’ 
For my part, I was hesitant about the vote in 2016; and I previously 
believed that a compromise that gave Britain some sort of associate 
membership of the EU would prove acceptable. But given the 
developments since the Referendum, I believe far more strongly that 
a clear and unambiguous Brexit has become necessary to resolve the 
issue with minimum political damage now and in the future. An 
ambiguous or duplicitous outcome would certainly perpetuate our 
present discontents. If a clear and legal popular vote were actually to 
be overridden or reversed, unknown dangers for our national 
cohesion and democratic legitimacy would be created. 
Moreover, there would be serious implications for the rest of the EU. It 
is notorious that in other countries (including Denmark, Ireland, 
Holland and even France) where referenda produced an outcome 
unacceptable to the European political elite, it was either re-run or 
circumvented. Few people, I think, would have believed such an 
outcome possible in Britain, given its deeply rooted tradition of 
government by consent, and no less, its established scepticism about 
the European Union and its aims. But if despite everything Brexit were 
to be blocked, it would show that, whatever law and treaty might say, 
leaving the EU by mutual consent is not possible for any nation. 
Historians, of whom I am one, rightly hesitate to predict the future. 
Given the present disquieting state of Europe, however, it seems safe 
to predict that a defeat of Brexit would not lead to the permanent 
triumph of a ‘European super-state’ or to the disappearance of 
Euroscepticism. Rather, it would mean that rejection of the EU no 
longer had a legal and peaceful outlet. That would be a dangerous 
prospect. 
 
David Paton, Professor,  Industrial Economics Nottingham 
University 
WHY ECONOMISTS CAN AND SHOULD DISAGREE ABOUT 
EVERYTHING…INCLUDING BREXIT  
WHAT’S THE ARGUMENT? 
At the heart of the economic arguments lies the effect of EU 
membership on trade and competitiveness. The EU Customs Union 
and Single Market are designed to make trade easier between EU 
countries, something standard economic theory suggests should 
benefit the economy. On the other hand, the Customs Union raises 
trade costs between EU and non-EU countries in a way which is likely 
to have a negative effect. 
In most cases, EU tariffs are relatively low, but there are important 
exceptions in sectors such as food, cars, footwear and clothing. 
Tariffs (as well as quota restrictions) provide a high level of protection 
to EU producers, something which will tend to have deleterious long 
run effects on productivity. 
A further issue is that the regulatory approach of the single market 
means that all companies have to comply with EU regulations whether 
not they export to the rest of the EU. As a result, any inefficiency in 
single market regulations is likely to raise costs of at least some UK 
firms. 
 
Graham Gudgin and Ken Coutts, the Centre for Business 
Research,  Cambridge University 
HOW THE ECONOMICS PROFESSION GOT IT WRONG ON BREXIT 
A wide range of reports estimating the impact of Brexit were published 
by official bodies and academic and consultancy groups during the 
Brexit referendum campaign of 2016. The Ashcroft poll undertaken 
immediately after the referendum indicated that among those who 
voted to remain the likely negative economic impact of Brexit was a 
major factor in their vote. It thus seems likely that these economic 
impact reports influenced the referendum vote. They are also likely to 
remain influential in informing views on the potential long-term 
consequences of a range of Brexit trade arrangements. 
Despite a lack of evidence that membership of the EU has improved 
living standards in the EU (Coutts et al, 2018), these reports all 
asserted that leaving the EU would damage the UK economy both in 
the run-up to departure and in the longer term. The most influential of 
these reports are from HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the 
OECD, all of which published predictions for both the short and long 
terms, and the LSE’s Centre for Economic Performance which 
estimated long-term impacts alone. 
 
Patrick Minford, Professor, Applied Economics Cardiff University 
THE DEFAULT OPTION OF A WORLD TRADE DEAL IS THE BEST AVAILABLE. 
But, you may rightly say, the Treasury is totally against a World Trade 
Deal, so why is that? Boris Johnson, when Foreign Secretary, 
discovered this and has since called the Treasury ‘the heart of 
Remain’. 
After discarding use of its widely criticised ‘gravity-like’ model used in 
the initial ‘Project Fear’ Referendum forecasts, the Treasury has now 
adopted use of a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model 
(GTAP from Purdue University) that is similar in approach to the World 
Trade Model at Cardiff University that we use – but it has inputted into 
this blameless model some ludicrous assumptions (let us ignore here 
their migration assumptions under which the flow of migrants is 
abruptly cut off, when it is generally agreed that skilled migrants will 
be flexibly treated and unskilled migrants will be allowed in temporarily 
and without access to state benefits). 
Based on the latest Treasury Report and its Technical Annex, the 
assumptions are flawed in two fundamental ways: 
1. a) They assume there will suddenly spring up at the EU-UK 
border large border costs and trade barriers which kill off our EU 
trade in a costly way. But as we have already seen, this is illegal 
nonsense, pure and simple. 
2. b) They assume we will fail to do much in the way of free trade 
agreements with the non-EU world. But in this they contradict 
the government’s very own policies. So this makes no sense 
either. For more details see Economists for Free Trade (2018). 
Why the Treasury and other civil servants have chosen to believe this 
nonsense no-one can say. It might be because the CBI and large 
manufacturing companies like Nissan, that dislike the extra 
competition Brexit will bring, have lobbied hard and brutally against 
Brexit. It may be out of pure prejudice or fear of any changes in the 
status quo. Who can tell? 
One thing is clear however. Leaving the EU cleanly allows us to move 
our policies to free trade, and good regulation, regaining our economic 
sovereignty. In all our history these policies have served us well. and 
they will do so again today. This is why in the Referendum, there was 
a majority for Brexit. The latest spurious Project Fear arguments from 
the establishment will not succeed in putting us off now any more than 
they did in the referendum itself. 
GWYTHIAN PRINS, EMERITUS PROFESSOR, LONDON SCHOOL OF 
ECONOMICS 
THE CASE FOR BREXIT IN DECEMBER 2018 
Until June 2016 and for the preceding four decades, the case for 
Brexit was straightforwardly a game of two halves. But since then it 
has divided unexpectedly – and venomously – into three parts. 
The long-standing two-part case was that, on the one hand, Brexit 
corrects geo-political and cultural errors that have constrained British 
power and influence in the world and that have disfigured British 
politics, breeding resentment and mistrust, for a generation. On the 
other, since committing the greatest geo-political error in modern 
European history by trying to force political union through the agency 
of a premature single currency, the ‘project of European union’ has 
been steadily advancing into the zone of risk of its own collapse. 
So conscious uncoupling from this rapidly imploding elite project was 
an eminently wise decision by voters who are more clear-sighted and 
less emotionally and, in many cases, financially committed to the EU, 
than the echo-chamber of experts. Who wishes to be shackled to a 
structural failure? 
‘The Case for Brexit’ is available NOW in paperback and digitally 
on Kindle. Find out more here. 
Other books in the Bite-Sized series include Do They Mean Us? The 
Foreign Correspondents’ View of Brexit, Keeping the Wheels on the 
Road – UK Auto Post Brexit and Will the Tory Party Ever Be the 
Same?, and are set to be published in early 2019. 
 
